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The Value of Step-by-Step Risk Assessment for Unmanned Aircraft
Anders la Cour-Harbo1
Abstract— The new European legislation expected in 2018 or
2019 will introduce a step-by-step process for conducting risk
assessments for unmanned aircraft flight operations. This is a
relatively simple approach to a very complex challenge. This
work compares this step-by-step process to high fidelity risk
modeling, and shows that at least for a series of example flight




In 2016 and 2017 EASA (European Aviation Safety
Agency) published proposals for legislation [1], [2], [3] on
unmanned aircraft in European airspace. This can reasonable
be expected to be a reliable precursor for a European
legislation in late 2018 or in 2019. This (coming) legislation
has adopted the JARUS (Joint Authorities for Rulemaking
on Unmanned Systems) proposal for three categories of
unmanned aircraft; Open, Specific, and Certified. This cate-
gorization is largely risk-based, and while the Open category
relies on limitations and operational rules, the Specific and
Certified categories rely on risk assessments to be made.
These assessments must address both air risk (collision with
a manned aircraft or another UA) and ground risk (collision
with persons or critical infrastructure). According to EASA
[1, p. 5] this risk assessment ’will incorporate [...] the
specific operations risk assessment (SORA), a methodology
developed by JARUS for the risk assessment required for
UAS operations in the Specific category.’
The SORA was published in a first version by JARUS on
April 1, 2018 [4] [TO REVIEWERS: This reference [4] is
to the draft version; I will refer to the final version in the
camera-ready submission of the paper]. The basic concept
of the SORA is a step-by-step process for breaking down
the complicated task of conducting a risk assessment for a
given flight operation, ending in a ’Specific Assurance and
Integrity Level’ that determines the necessary preparations,
documentations, and mitigations necessary for the flight
operation to achieve an acceptable level of risk.
This work focuses on how accurate such a discretization
of the risk assessment really is, and if the step-by-step
approach reasonably can be expected to provide a reliable
risk assessment.
B. Previous work
There are numerous works on how to conceptually ap-
proach the challenge of determining the risk of an unmanned
aircraft flight. Such works typically borrow from the world of
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manned aviation where risk management has been practiced
for decades. A number of examples of risk assessments and
quantifications for unmanned aircraft include the following.
A probabilistic approach to midair collisions is found in [5],
where separation of aircraft over the North Atlantic is
discussed, and in [6], where a Monte Carlo simulation model
is used. [7] takes a combined first principle and stochastic
approach to midair collision modeling. A model for vertical
separation of manned aircraft is presented in [8]. In [9]
a method for determining a no-thrust flight trajectory to
reach a particular landing spot is presented. The uncontrolled
descent of unmanned aircraft into populated areas have been
the subject in a number of publications. This includes [10]
that investigate larger aircraft through an equivalent level
of safety analysis. [11] specifically looks at distribution of
possible impact positions based on simulation, and [12] uses
a standard statistical setup and applies a normal distribution
approach using aircraft glide parameters to model the impact
position. In [13] a comprehensive description of how to man-
age the risk of unmanned aircraft operations, including ’the
systematic application of management policies, procedures
and practices to the activities of communicating, consulting,
establishing the context, and assessing, evaluating, treating,
monitoring and reviewing risk.’ The barrier bow tie model
also used in manned aviation risk assessment is presented in
[14]. [15] addresses the lack of an accepted framework and
provides some guidelines for how to apply existing models
to manage the risk. An study on the impact area for a general
uncontrolled descent, including a buffer zone, is presented in
[16]. Metrics for safety, including hazard metrics and risks
metrics are presented in [17], in [18] a software safety case
is developed, and in [19] a generic safety case is presented
based on experience with NASA unmanned aircraft missions.
A method for automatically finding a proper landing area for
an aircraft in emergency descent is shown in [20], [21], and
the ability of a fixed wing aircraft to glide to a designated
emergency landing area is presented in [22]. In [23] a study
for ground impact fatalities resulting from power failure
and subsequent uncontrolled glide is presented. An overview
in [24] gives a thorough analysis of a variety of ground
impact models.
C. Current work
The purpose of this work is to evaluate the use of the
SORA step-by-step procedure for assessing the risk, against
the concept of modeling the risk using a high fidelity risk
model (HFRM). No new approach and no new model will be
presented in this work. The basic assumption is that a model
with adequate resolution and details will be able to reliable
TABLE I
PARAMETER VARIATIONS FOR COMPARATIVE STUDY
Parameter Value 1 Value 2
Type of aircraft HEF32 Cumulus One
20 kg rotorcraft 2 kg fixed wing
Overflown area Partly urban Rural
Parachute Yes No
predict the risk for a given flight scenario. The question to
be answered is if the comparatively crude approach of the
SORA has sufficient value to reproduce the modeled-based
assessment.
Since a full comparison between the SORA and model
approaches would be quite extensive and well outside the
scope of a single paper, we will focus on a set of particular
flight scenarios in the Specific category. This will obviously
not fully satisfy the claim that a step-by-step process and a
model based approach are equally valid, but it would serve
to demonstrate the potential of simplifying a high-fidelity
model into an easier to grasp approach.
II. METHODS
This work is divided into three main sections, starting
with this section on the SORA and HFRM methods. Then
in Section III the SORA and HFRM are applied to a series
of flight scenarios to establish a means for comparison, and
the actual comparison in done in Section IV.
This section starts in Subsection II-A with discussing
the flight scenarios forming the basis of the comparison,
followed by Subsections II-B and II-C with details on the
SORA and HFRM methods. Finally, in Subsection II-D
fatality rate is introduced as the comparison metric.
A. Flight scenarios
To have a meaningful result we have chosen to compare
the SORA and HFRM using 8 different scenarios all based on
an 80 km BVLOS flight operation and generated by varying
3 distinct parameters shown in Table I. All 8 variations take
different paths in the SORA method, and all 8 can be specif-
ically addressed in the HFRM. Each variation is therefore
a scenario where SORA and HFRM can be independently
compared.
1) Type of aircraft: Two somewhat different types of
aircraft are considered; the HEF32 from Higheye and the Cu-
mulus One from Sky-Watch. Both have sufficient endurance
and flight capabilities to conduct the flight, but are otherwise
quite different. The Cumulus One in general is an aircraft
with an assurance and integrity level equivalent of SAIL II
in the SORA, while the HEF32 is at SAIL II to IV, varying
over Human Error, Technical Issues, and Adverse Operating
Conditions. As the manufacturer (Higheye) as well as the
research group behind this paper is working towards SAIL
IV overall we will assume this to be the case for this work.
2) Overflown area: A flight path covering about 20%
urban area has been chosen as flight path 1. This path has
then been altered to avoid any urban areas, resulting in flight
path 2. Both flight paths and the population density is shown
TABLE II
STEPS OF THE SORA PROCESS (FROM [4]).
Purpose Steps Outcome
ConOps 0–1 Foundation for assessment
Ground risk 2–5 SAIL value
Air risk 6–9 SAIL value
Threat barriers 10 Measures to take
Check and verification 11-12 Ensuring proper assessment
in Figure 1. Flight path 1 is about 83 km, while path 2 is
about 85 km. Care has been take to change as little possible,
such that the two flight paths are comparable despite their
differences.
3) Parachute: An emergency recovery capability is con-
sider a significant asset for an unmanned aircraft, and both
aircraft are fitted with this; the HEF32 carries a parachute
on top of the rotor head, while the Cumulus One aircraft
is able to enter a stable deep stall equilibrium, and in
this configuration the aircraft descents as if attached to a
parachute.
B. Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA)
The SORA is conducted through a total of 13 steps that
are detailed in the SORA document from JARUS [4]. An
overview of the steps are seen in Table II, and this work
will focus on the steps for air and ground risk. Based on
the ConOps (Concept of Operations) for the aircraft and
its intended mission, two parallel assessments are made for
ground and air risk, respectively. The ground risk depends
on the type of ground overflown and the size of the aircraft,
while the air risk depends on the type of airspace and the
tactical mitigations available. Each assessment ends with a
Specific Assurance and Integrity Level (SAIL) ranging from
0 to 6, and the highest one is used in the threat barriers step,
where this SAIL is used to determine the type and level
of threat barriers necessary to allow flight operations. The
SORA steps are relatively clear and unequivocal, with only
minor room for interpretations, and as such provide a risk
assessment that does not require substantial knowledge of
how to determine risks and necessary measures to mitigate
them.
C. High-fidelity modeling of risks
An alternative to the step-by-step process is a detailed
modeling of the flight mission based on the ConOps and the
parameters for the aircraft. This approach is a likelihood esti-
mation of chain of events that lead to a fatality, and a number
of models exist for both ground and air risk estimations (see
Section I-B). In this work we will use previous works by the
author developed specifically to conduct a quantitative risk
assessment that is comparable to the SORA process. For the
ground risk the model from [25] will be used, and for the
air risk the model from [26] will be used.
We will follow the methods as laid out in the referenced
works, and both contain detailed examples to explain how
the methods work, also in the setup used in this work. As
such, there will be no detailed explanation of these methods
here.
Fig. 1. The flight path 1 (light purple) follows an imaginary pipeline in need of inspection. It passes through both rural and urban areas. It starts at the
lower right close to Roskilde, and goes over Holbæk halfway, and ends at Sjællands Odde. Flight path 2 (dark purple) is the original flight path altered
to avoid urban areas, but still follow the pipeline (as much as possible). Path 1 and 2 are about 80% identical, differing only where there is urban areas
overflown. Path 2 simply circumvents any urban area overflown with path 1. The population density is shown as white (density 0) over light green, green,
orange to red for increasing density, with a resolution of 100 m × 100 m. The green patches are topographical indications of officially recognized urban
areas.
D. Comparison using fatality rate
The comparison metric between SORA and HFRM is done
via the fatality rate, which in some sense is the ultimate goal
of any risk assessment. That is, if the assessment concludes
that the fatality rate is sufficiently low, the mission can
be conducted. The question to be addressed in this work
essentially is if the fatality rate from the SORA and the
modeled approaches line up for the same missions.
In the SORA the starting point is a desired maximum
fatality rate, and the entire process is intended to determine
the necessary procedures, barriers, and mitigations to achieve
this. In the model approach it is the opposite, in the sense
that given all parameters for a particular mission, the fatality
rate can be determined.
The SORA states that ’The objective for the number of
fatal injuries to third parties on the ground (per flight hour)
comes from a principle of equivalence with the manned
aviation [...]’ [4, p. 21], but does not specifically provide
a quantification of this. It is indicated that a level of 10−6
fatalities per flight hour would be acceptable, although this
is rather high compare to at least commercial aviation [13].
However, for this work we will stick with this number for
the sake of comparison.
III. APPLYING METHODS
The SORA and HFRM methods are now applied to the
8 flight scenarios. First, in Subsection III-A the SORA is
applied to the ground risk, following by the HFRM applied
to the ground risk in Subsection III-B. The probabilities
associated with malfunctions of the aircraft are discussed in
Subsection III-C, and the HFRM output is them presented
in Subsection III-D.
Then the SORA air risk is processed in Subsection III-E
followed by a brief review of the resulting threat barriers in
Subsection III-F. Then in Subsection III-G the HFRM for air
risk is presented.
A. Determining the ground risk using SORA
The steps #2 through #5 is for determining the risk
associated with ground impacts [4].
Step #2: Determination of the intrinsic Ground Risk Class
The first parameter for determining the Ground Risk Class
(GRC) is the ’UAS lethal area’ and the intended type of
operation. The former is quantified through the ’max UAS
characteristic dimension’ which for the Cumulus aircraft is
TABLE III
GROUND RISK CLASSES FOR SORA
Intrinsic UAS Ground Risk Class




Operational scenario for aircraft Cumulus HEF
BVLOS over populated environment
Flight path 1 6 7
BVLOS over sparsely populated area
Flight path 2 2 3
Final UAS Ground Risk Class
Flight path 1
After applying harm barriers 4 6
Flight path 2
After applying harm barriers 0 2
1.65 meter, putting the aircraft in the ’3 m’ category (Figure
8 in the SORA) with an expected kinetic energy of < 34 kJ.
However, the actual kinetic energy of the aircraft, at mass 2
kg and cruise speed 16 m/s, is around 250 J, well below the
expected max value of 700 J for the smaller < 1 m category.
Therefore, the 1 m category is appropriate. The HEF32 has
rotor diameter of 1.82 m, and kinetic energy at cruise speed
of approximately 10 kJ. This puts it in the ’3 m’ category.
The second parameter for determining GRC is ’Opera-
tional scenario’. For the partially urban scenario this will
be category ’BVLOS over populated environment’, while
the purely rural scenario is category ’BVLOS over sparsely
populated environment’. This results in the GRC values listed
in Table III.
Step #3: Identification of harm barriers
Three harm barriers are listed in Table 2 of the SORA. For
the first barrier we will assume the existence of a Medium
integrity Emergency Response Plan (ERP). For the second
barrier both aircraft are equipped with means of reducing
the ground impact effects. Since the HEF is still capable
of causing a fatality in a parachuted descent, the robustness
will be set to Medium, while for the Cumulus the deep stall
descent has been proven non-lethal, and thus qualifies as
robustness High. For the third barrier there is no effect in
the presented scenarios. Following Table 2 in SORA this
gives a reduction of the GRC by 1 for the HEF32 and by 2
for the Cumulus.
Step #4: Lethality determination
The SORA does not provide much detail on lethality determi-
nation. In fact, the lethality is simple quantified as ’average’
if there is neither extenuating nor aggravating circumstances
for the aircraft.
Step #5: SAIL determination
Determining the Specific Assurance and Integrity Level
(SAIL) is the last step in the ground impact assessment. This
is done using Table 4 in SORA, and the result is shown in
Table IV.
B. Determining the ground risk using HFRM
The model for ground fatalities is a stochastic model that
joins probabilities in the causal chain from drone malfunction
TABLE IV
GROUND IMPACT SPECIFIC ASSURANCE AND INTEGRITY LEVEL BASED
ON TABLE 4 IN SORA.
SAIL
Operational scenario for aircraft Cumulus HEF
Flight path 1
Without parachute/deep stall V VI
Flight path 2
Without parachute/deep stall I II
Flight path 1
With parachute/deep stall III V
Flight path 2
With parachute/deep stall 0 I
to a potential fatality, and is based on the model in [25]. It
takes the form
pfatality = pevent · pimpact person · pfatal impact , (1)
where pevent is the probability per time of a given event
(of which we will use four), pimpact person is the conditional
probability that given an occurrence of one of the events that
a person will be impacted as a result, and pfatal impact is the
conditional probability that this person suffers a fatal injury.
The four events are ballistic descent, uncontrolled glide,
parachute-like descent, and flyaway. These event types, in-
cluding how they are modeled, are described in more detail
in [25], [27], [28].
This HFRM uses a rather large set of parameters due to
the complicated and detailed nature of the descent models.
In addition to the few variations listed in Table I, the first
principles HFRM parameters used for the modeling are listed
in Table V. The computational parameters for discretization
and numerical integration are similar to those used in [25]
and are not repeated here.
C. Event probabilities
The event probabilities pevent are listed in Table VI. These
are crucial parameters in the sense that they relate indirectly
to the level of assurance and integrity of the aircraft and
their operations as described in the SORA. The numbers
listed here are NOT actual numbers for the two aircraft (to
the best of the author’s knowledge those numbers are not
known), but are rather expressions of conservative estimates
based on the quality of the aircraft parts (mechanics and
electronics), associated pilot training, available procedures
for normal, abnormal, and emergency situations, availability
of documentation to operators, maintenance procedures, au-
topilot flight hours, etc. In fact, the event probabilities are
directly dependent on the threat barriers listed under Step
#10 in the SORA (see Section III-F), and the probabilities
listed in Table VI are derived from a Cumulus One at SAIL
II and HEF32 at SAIL IV.
Note that for the rotorcraft an uncontrolled glide is consid-
ered a descent, where the aircraft has lost some of its lift (for
instance due to a malfunctioning actuator) and will descent
fairly quickly with rotor still spinning.
TABLE V
HFRM PARAMETERS (SEE [25] FOR USE)
.
Parameter Cumulus HEF32
Flight time 2.5 h 4.5 h
Mass 2 kg 20 kg
Cruise speed 16 m/s 18 m/s
Glide speed 12 m/s 16 m/s
Glide ratio N(10, 2) N(3, 0.5)
Drag coef for ballistic N(0.9, 0.2) N(0.7, 0.2)
Drag area for ballistic 0.02 m2 0.1 m2
Person impact area ballistic 25 cm2 100 cm2
Person IA parachute/deep stall 0.5 m2 0.3 m2
Person IA glide/fly-away 50 cm2 144 cm2
Drag coef parachute/deep stall N(0.94, 0.1) N(1.13, 0.2)
Drag area parachute/deep stall 0.5 m2 12.57 m2
Parameters Path 1 Path 2
Flight distance 81 km 83 km
Flight altitude 75 m 75 m
Number of WPs 23 53
Wind speed N(1, 0.4) / N(5, 2) / N(9, 3.6)
Wind direction N(0, 0.17) [from west]
Flyaway – long short ratio 0.01
Flyaway – short distance sigma 4000 m
TABLE VI
EVENT PROBABILITIES (EVENTS PER HOUR).
Ballistic UG Parachute Flyaway
HEF parachute 1/700 1/600 1/150 1/1000
HEF no parachute 1/210 1/200 n/a 1/1000
Cumulus deep stall 1/150 1/120 1/40 1/100
Cumulus no deep stall 1/52 1/48 n/a 1/100
The parachute/deep stall event is meant to ’capture’ some
of the ballistic and uncontrolled glide events, that is, the
parachute/deep stall will be initiated in some of the cases
where the aircraft would otherwise have descended ballisti-
cally or uncontrolled. It follows that when there is no such
emergency recovery capability available (the no-parachute
option in Table I) the probability has been shifted (equally)
to the ballistic and uncontrolled glide events. Consequently,
the total probability for ballistic, uncontrolled glide, and
parachute is the same with and without parachute/deep stall.
D. HFRM model output
The results of using ground impact HFRM on all 8
scenarios is shown in Figure 2. In addition to the scenarios
the wind speed is also varied, because it plays a significant
role in the descent models. In particular, a parachute/deep
stall descent has a much higher impact speed (and thus
lethality) if the wind is higher. This feature is not captured
in any way in the SORA, but included here to see what
impact it has. It is important to note that while HFRM
produces seemingly very accurate fatality rates, one should
focus only on the order of magnitude of the results, since
the numbers will invariably change with adjustments to any
of the many parameters, some of which are purely educated
guesses (see [25] for discussion of this topic).
E. Determining the airspace encounter risk using SORA
The steps #6 through #9 is for determining the risk
associated with airspace encounters.
TABLE VII
AIR RISK VALUES FOR SORA
Scenario Partly urban Rural
AEC 9 10
Initial ARC 3 2
Intermediate ARC
Operational Restrictions 3 2
Final ARC
Structures and Rules 3 2
SAIL IV II
Uncontained ARC 3 3
Recommended max loss
of containment rate 10
−3 per hour 10−3 per hour
Tactical Mitigation
Performance Requirement Medium Low
Detection level for
DAA system 90% 50%
Step #6: Determination of the Airspace Encounter Category
There are 12 AECs in the SORA. The only variations in
scenarios in this work that affects the AEC is whether
the flight is (partly) over urban or rural areas. For urban
areas (flight path 1) the AEC is 9, which reads ’Operations
below 500 ft. AGL within Uncontrolled Airspace over urban
environment’, and for rural areas (flight path 2) the AEC is
10, which reads ’Operations in Class G airspace below 500
ft. AGL over Rural environment’.
Step #7: Initial Air-Risk Class (ARC) Assignment
The initial ARC follows directly from the AEC using Table
5 in SORA. The result is shown in Table VII.
Step #8: Identification of the Strategic Mitigations
There are no strategic mitigations of any kind in any of the
listed scenarios. It is possible to use a study of the traffic
density in the target airspace, but the SORA provides no
guidelines for this. As this is a comparative study with just
such a method, it would defy the purpose to use the HFRM
to determine traffic density. As such, neither the ’operational
restrictions’ nor ’structures and rules’ mitigative means will
reduce the initial ARC. The resulting SAIL follows from
Table 6 in SORA, and the result is listed in Table VII.
The last part of this step is determining the Uncontained
ARC, i.e. ARC of areas adjacent to the flight path. Since
all flights are close to urban areas the adjacent airspace is
regularly through both flight paths AEC 9 with ARC 3. In
addition, the flight paths pass just outside the controlled
airspace of Roskilde Airport (EKRK). The AEC for this
airspace is AEC 8 for which the ARC is also 3. Conse-
quently, SORA recommends means that ensure that breach
of containment is less likely than 1 per 1000 flight hours.
Step #9: Tactical Mitigation Performance Requirement
(TMPR) Assignment
Tactical mitigation allows for short term or on-the-fly miti-
gation. Following the determination of final ARC the TMPR
are assigned as listed in Table VII, and according to Annex
C in the SORA, these TMPR levels give raise to a minimum
capability of the Detect and Avoid system used.












































Ballistic Uncontrolled glide Parachute Flyaway
Fig. 2. Result of using HFRM on all 8 flight scenarios. For each scenario 3 different wind speeds were used (1, 5, and 9 m/s, see Table V) since this
affects the parachute/deep stall fatality rate somewhat. The height of each bar shows the total rate (probability of fatality per flight hour), and each bar
also shows how the rate is composed from the four different modeled descent events. Note that the second axis is an order of magnitude smaller for the
rural flight path compared to the urban flight path.
F. Identification of recommended threat barriers (Step #10)
The threat barriers needed to allow flight operations to
commence can now be determined as step #10 using Table
9 in the SORA. The barriers required for each of the 8
scenarios should, if the SORA and HFRM methods line
up, be precisely those that produces the event probabilities
listed in Table VI. This will be examined in the Results in
Section IV.
Step #11 and Step #12 are revisions of the risk assessment,
and will no be addressed in this work.
G. Determining the airspace encounter risk using HFRM
The model for airspace encounter risk is based on the
model presented in [26]. It models the fatality rate for
impacts between a general aviation (GA) aircraft (such as
smaller fixed wing, rotorcraft, hang gliders, ultra lights, etc),
and an unmanned aircraft (UA). It is composed of three
probabilistic parts that are assumed independent, plus two
factors to account for mitigations and lethality. The model is
rfatality = phi · pvi · pbelow · λstm · pfatality . (2)
The first term phi is the probability of ’horizontal impact’
based on the speeds of the GA and the UA, and is probability
per time unit. The second term pvi is the probability of
’vertical impact’, which is based on probability density
functions for the altitude of both aircraft, as well as the height
of both aircraft. The third term pbelow is the probability that
the GA is below 100 meter, the general maximum flight
altitude in Denmark. The fourth term λsm is the effect of
strategic and tactical mitigations. For an in-depth description
of the terms, see [26].
The fifth term pfatality is the probability of one fatality
as a consequence of impact. This term is not part of the
original impact model, but is specifically included here to
accommodate the comparison with the SORA (as described
in Section II-D).
The majority of the parameters in this model are air traffic
densities and first principle parameters for 9 different types
of aircraft. For this work, these are chosen identical to the
parameters in [26]. In addition, the parameters for the two
unmanned aircraft in this work, HEF32 and Cumulus One,
are shown in Table VIII.
The parameters for strategic/tactical mitigation and lethal-
ity are listed in Table IX. When λsm = 1 there is no
mitigation, which is the case for most GA. However, since
the HEF32 is equipped with FAR23 compliant navigation
and anti-collision lighting, which makes the aircraft easier
to see for GA, also during daytime operations (see CFR
TABLE VIII
PARAMETERS FOR THE AIRCRAFT FOR AIRSPACE ENCOUNTER HFRM.
Parameter Cumulus HEF
Altitude distribution N(75, 8) N(75, 8)
Safety radius 1.65 m 1.90 m
Cruise speed 16 m/s 18 m/s
Aircraft height 0.3 m 0.9 m
TABLE IX













Fixed wing 1 1 0.8 1
Rotorcraft 1 1 0.5 1
Glider





1 1 1 1
Balloon 0.01 0.5 0.01 2
§23.1401 - Anti-collision light system), lower values have
been used for fixed-wing and rotorcraft. The assumption
is that such lighting will indeed lower the probability of
collision with 20% and 50%, respectively, since pilots of
such GA aircraft can be presumed to observant for other
air traffic, and recognize anti-collision lighting. More so for
rotorcraft which typically will be flying relatively slow at
very low altitudes. In addition, a strategic mitigation for
balloons is set very low, assuming that balloons are operated
in known locations, and at known times. The basis for this
assumption is detailed in [26].
Lethality is set to 1 for most GA (meaning that on average
one fatality will result from a midair collision). However,
given the small mass of the Cumulus One aircraft and the
relatively low speed of gliders on approach (which is most
likely the case below 100 meter) the lethality for gliders is set
to 0.5. Also, assuming that the Cumulus will most likely not
damage a balloon to the point where it will descent rapidly,
the balloon lethality is also at 0.5. On the other hand, the
HEF32 will very likely significantly crippled a balloon, and
assuming more than one person in the balloon basket, the
lethality is set to 2.
The result of applying all of the above parameters to the
HFRM for airspace encounters is shown in Figure 3. The
model does not directly support distinctions between rural
and urban airspace, and as such the results as shown apply
equally to both types of airspace.
IV. RESULTS
The previous section contains a series of outputs from
the SORA and the HFRM, and the aim in this section is


























Fig. 3. The probability of fatality from a midair collision based on the
HFRM in (2). Results are shown for both unmanned aircraft. The total
probabilities are 1.6 · 10−7 fatalities per flight hour for the Cumulus and
2.2 · 10−7 fatalities per flight hour for the HEF. The probabilities related




Operational scenario for aircraft Cumulus HEF
Flight path 1 (urban)
Without parachute/deep stall V VI
Flight path 2 (rural)
Without parachute/deep stall II II
Flight path 1 (urban)
With parachute/deep stall IV V
Flight path 2 (rural)
With parachute/deep stall II II
The final SAIL for the SORA is obtained by combining the
SAIL in Tables IV and VII. The result is shown in Table X,
where the lower value of II is originating in the midair
collision risk, and the upper values of IV to VI originate
in the ground impact risk.
At the same time it was shown using high-fidelity model-
ing that the ground fatality rate as well as the midair collision
fatality rate in all 8 scenarios were around or below 10−6
fatalities per flight hours, as seen in Figures 2 and 3. It
is important to note that the values depicted in Figure 2
are averages over the entire flight. Since the flight paths
are 80% the same, the one magnitude of overall different
between urban and rural are in fact caused by ’only’ the
20% difference in flight path. This is because the POF
for the urban parts of the flights often raises to 10−5 and
occasionally even higher.
The first concluding observation is that both the Cumulus
SAIL II aircraft and the HEF SAIL IV aircraft achieve (in
SORA terms) very acceptable POF per flight hour in the rural
flight scenarios. However, for the urban scenarios the POF
is only just acceptable for the HEF, though slightly better
for the Cumulus, and only because the majority of the flight
is over rural areas that contribute significantly to reduce the
average POF. For a purely urban flight both aircraft would
exceed the 10−6 POF, the HEF with roughly on order of
magnitude, and the Cumulus with a factor of 2 or 3 (this is
not visible from any presented figure, but it is clear from the
detailed modeling output).
The second concluding observation is that the final SAIL
values partly corroborates the first concluding observation:
From Table X we see that the required SAIL for all rural
flights is II, thus according to the SORA both Cumulus and
HEF are acceptable for the rural flights. It also follows from
the table that none of the urban flights can be conducted
with the present aircraft. Even though the SAIL IV HEF32
may seem close to the SAIL V requirement for urban flight
(with parachute), the actual step from SAIL IV to SAIL V is
quite large, and not realistically achievable with the current
HEF32 aircraft.
Additionally, it is noticeable that while the SORA consid-
ers a parachute a significant reduction in risk (by allowing
for one full GRC point to be subtracted) this effect is
not nearly as significant for the HFRM approach. This is
because the kinetic energy on impact is still quite large,
especially if the aircraft in addition to the vertical descent
is moving horizontally with a significant speed due to wind.
In the modeled scenario the shelter factor for the parachuted
descent is double that of the shelter factor for other descents,
based on the assumption that there is a 50% chance of
spotting the descending aircraft when it is hanging from a
parachute. This may be set somewhat too low, though.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Overall, the step-by-step process of the SORA approach
and the detailed modeling of HFRM approach seems to be
largely in agreement. The methods are hugely different and
any metric for comparison is bound to be less than perfect,
and the uncertainty associated with these risk assessments
due to lack of exact knowledge and historical flight data
to backup assumptions only adds to the overall impression
that the two methods generally align fairly well despite the
obvious points of misalignment.
The hope that the much simpler SORA approach can
generally capture sufficient details to provide reliable and
trustworthy risk assessment seems justified, at least to the
extend covered by the flight scenarios presented in this work.
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